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Resumo
As infra-estruturas críticas de TI para serviços públicos são apoiadas por inúmeros sistemas
complexos. Estes sistemas permitem a gestão e recolha de informação em tempo-real, con-
stituindo a base para a gestão eficiente das operações. A utilização, cada vez mais fre-
quente, de software e hardware (Commercial Off-The-Shelf, COTS) em sistemas SCADA
permitiu grandes beneficios financeiros na aquisição e desenvolvimento de soluções téc-
nicas que suportam os serviços públicos. O uso de hardware e software COTS em sistemas
SCADA transferiu para as infra-estruturas críticas os problemas de segurança de uma infra-
estrutura de TI empresarial.
Neste contexto, um desafio para as equipas de gestão operacional dos sistemas de TI é a
gestão eficaz dos sistemas e redes que compõem as infra-estruturas críticas dos serviços
públicos. Apesar de estas organizações adoptarem, cada vez mais, normas e melhores
práticas que visam melhorar a gestão, operações e processos de configuração.
Este projecto de investigação propõe-se a desenvolver um estudo comparativo de plata-
formas de gestão integrada no contexto dos sistemas SCADA que suportam serviços públi-
cos. Adicionalmente, este projecto de investigação irá desenvolver estudos acerca de perfis
operacionais dos Sistemas Operativos que suportam a infra-estrutura IT dos serviços públi-
cos críticos. Este projecto de investigação irá descrever como as decisões estratégicas de
gestão têm impacto nas operações de gestão de uma infra-estrutura TI.
Palavras-chave: SCADA; Segurança; Monitorização; Sistemas Operativos; Plataformas
de Gestão Integrada;
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Abstract
Modern critical utility IT infrastructures are supported by numerous complex systems.
These systems allow real-time management and information collection, which is the basis
of efficient service management operations. The usage of commercial off-the-shelf (COTS)
hardware and software in SCADA systems allowed for major financial advantages in pur-
chasing and developing technical solutions. On the other hand, this COTS hardware and
software generalized usage in SCADA systems, exposed critical infrastructures to the se-
curity problems of a corporate IT infrastructure.
A significant challenge for IT teams is managing critical utility IT infrastructures even upon
adopting security best practices that help management, operations and configuration of the
systems and network components that comprise those infrastructures.
This research project proposes to survey integrated management software that can address
the specific security constraints of a SCADA infrastructure supported by COTS software.
Additionally, this research project proposes to investigate techniques that will allow the
creation of operational profiles of Operating Systems supporting critical utility IT infra-
structures.
This research project will describe how the strategic management decisions impact tac-
tical operations management of an IT environment. We will investigate desirable technical
management elements in support of the operational management.
Keywords: SCADA; Security; Monitoring; Operating Systems; Integrated Management
Platforms;
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Chapter 1
Introduction
1.1 Motivation
Modern Critical Utility IT Infrastructures are supported by numerous complex systems.
These systems allow real-time management and information collection, which is the basis
of efficient service management operations. SCADA stands for Supervisory Control And
Data Acquisition and it serves to designate these types of systems.[1]. The main function
of SCADA systems is to provide accurate, and as close to real-time, information while
allowing operators to respond to events in order to maintain the functional requirements of
a system.
To support the communication of SCADA data a communication network must be in place.
Traditionally these communication systems operated proprietary protocols on fixed tele-
phone landlines and modems. As communication networks evolved, TCP/IP based tech-
nology became an efficient way of communicating SCADA data. TCP/IP was used to
overcome some of the legacy problems and also allowed for more flexibility in terms of
scalability and operations.
As with communications, systems and hardware also became more mainstream and with
that, the usage of COTS (commercial, off-the-shelf) hardware and software in SCADA
systems allowed for major financial advantages in purchasing and developing. On the other
hand, this COTS hardware and software generalized usage in SCADA systems, exposed
critical infrastructures to the security problems of a corporate network.
A significant challenge for IT teams managing Critical Utility IT Infrastructures are man-
agement, operations and configuration of the systems and network components that com-
prise those infrastructures. The management knowledge travels from the corporate world
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into a distinct paradigm. Usually, the properties that have to be achieved by the systems
supporting critical infrastructures differ from those on the corporate world.
One source of security concerns is the operational management of the IT infrastructure.
Operations can drive a system, and potentially the whole IT infrastructure, to an insecure
state. As the systems that support the SCADA operations rely more on COTS hardware and
software, infrastructure security relies on extending operational procedures common on
corporate infrastructures to the SCADA infrastructure domain. Another important aspect
of these SCADA infrastructures is that they are in constant evolution in response to the
company’s demands. This puts an even greater stress on the operational management staff
capabilities, and often security problems originate in erroneous operational configurations.
One extremely important threat to critical utilities is Cyber-Terrorism which, in general
terms, relates information technology to unconventional warfare attacks. In [2], Purpura
draws a broad picture of the practical implications of Terrorism for the United States of
America, but his reasoning is quite accurate for other country’s reality. In his characteriza-
tion of terrorism he describes specific forms of terrorism, like Cyber-Terrorism. Common
sense and history have proved, numerous times, that utilities are a natural target in conven-
tional warfare and unconventional warfare scenarios.
By 2005, the SmartGrids European Technology Platform for Electricity Networks of the
Future started with the promotion of a new vision for the development of European electri-
city networks[3]. For this vision to become reality it is required that all the stakeholders,
involved in the project, are aware of the challenges that lay ahead. Some of these fore-
seeable challenges are heavily dependent on information and communication technologies
and the resilience of those technologies to failures or attacks.
This research project will focus on establishing the grounds to achieve a dependable oper-
ational environment for a critical utility IT infrastructure. We will establish a strategy to
maintain a dependable environment, based on COTS software, and survey operational man-
agement platforms, from several industry vendors, accessing their coverage for the tactical
requirements of such an environment.
One of the goals of this project is to investigate techniques that will allow the monitorig of
COTS systems supporting criticl utility IT infrastructure. This information has significant
value for day-to-day operations and can also be used in behavior-based intrusion detection,
note that behavior-based detection can coexist with signature-based detection in such in-
frastructures. System monitoring is a starting point for a complete security management
process which includes assessing risks and threats, product vulnerabilities and new attack
vectors. This work will enable the operational management team to create strategies and
2
plans for detection of threats and protection of the SCADA IT infrastructure.
1.2 Contributions
This research project is a subset of an ongoing major effort to improve the security of the
SCADA system for a European Electric Power Company.
The starting point for this research project is the necessity to evaluate tools that will enable
a global strategy of Defense-in-Depth of the complete critical utility IT infrastructure. One
important goal is detailing a plan for the evolution of a reliable management platform on
which next generation demands can be met without compromising security.
This research project will include studying several techniques of monitoring of OS in-
formation. The gathered information will promote the creation of a plan to supervise the
SCADA IT infrastructure. A first step will require the study of IT operations management
platforms, these platforms will allow the collection of relevant metrics and events on which
the operational management of the SCADA IT infrastructure can define security policies.
The collected information will in turn be correlated with other information ( NIDS, firewall
logs ) to achieve full coverage of the IT infrastructure.
Furthermore, this research project will focus on studying the Microsoft Windows Operating
System architecture supporting these critical information systems in order to investigate
systems analysis techniques which can help identify threats to systems and, ultimately, the
whole infrastructure.
3
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Chapter 2
Critical Utility IT Infrastructures
Security Management
2.1 IT Infrastructure Service Management
The growing complexity and evolution of IT infrastructures lead to IT Service Manage-
ment concept. Winniford et.al., studied the currently adopted concepts and frameworks
[4]. The study concluded that the broad definitions of the concepts and frameworks are
sufficient for the upper management requirements of the IT Service Management process.
The frameworks studied aim at managing service of generic IT infrastructures and are
extremely valuable in order to relate the Critical Utility IT Infrastructure to the upper man-
agement business requirements. One interesting concept of IT Service Management is the
”functional silos” concept, i.e. aggregation of IT services with end-to-end definitions for
availability and performance, that concept loosely relates to the defense-in-depth strategy
for achieving dependable Critical Utility IT infrastructures.
IT Service Management concepts have grown out, among others, of the Information Tech-
nology Infrastructure Library - ITIL[5]. Currently the IT community discusses the exact
scope and overlapping of IT concepts, such as ITSM, ITIL, Control Objectives for In-
formation and related Technology - CobiT[6]. Additionally, the International Standards
Organization (ISO) ratified ISO/IEC 20000 a standard that brings together these several
paradigms under a common set of principles, which can be generally defined as IT Service
Management.
Next, we characterize some of these views on IT systems management. This description
serves to situate Critical Utility IT infrastructures management in the complex management
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scenario of an organization.
2.1.1 ITIL
General recognition of IT service management needs resulted in the definition and rise of
ITIL, a set of books describing best practices in several areas of service management. Cur-
rently the scope has been broadened to include a life-cycle perspective on service strategy,
design, transition, operation, and continuous improvement. ITIL service support consists
of several sub-processes for making structured changes to the infrastructure. ITIL service
delivery defines sub-processes for maintaining the infrastructure running at agreed-upon
levels, including Service Level Management - SLM as one of those sub-processes.
2.1.2 IT Governance
Started by the audit abuses that prompted the Sarbanes-Oxley Legislation - SOX [7], IT
governance is yet another term subject to broad and narrow definitions. IT Governance
in a strict sense is the appropriation of decision rights in an organization structure, and
in a broad sense is the overall strategy. This strategy definition includes risk, financial,
and process management. IT governance does not address the daily management of an IT
organization.
2.1.3 CobiT
The Information Systems Audit and Control Association - ISACA [6] has developed the
Control Objectives for Information and related Technology to translate another paradigm
of IT management concepts. CobiT groups IT governance objectives into areas cover-
ing: Planning and organizing; Acquiring and implementing; Delivering and supporting;
Monitoring and evaluating. The CobiT framework seeks to create business controls and
accountability while still viewing IT service in terms of functional silos .
2.1.4 ITSM
In 2005, the International Standards Organization - ISO ratified ISO/IEC 20000 [8] which,
again, brings together several service management streams under a common set of prin-
ciples, which are generally called IT Service Management. It defines both a specification
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and a code of practice for service management. The service delivery areas of IT operations
management have little, to none, published academic research. Researchers are still trying
to determine the industry maturity, understanding and adoption of IT Service Management
practices.
2.2 IT Infrastructures Security Management Process
Security management planning requires the creation, deployment, and enforcement of a se-
curity policy. The most effective way to address security management planning is using a
top-down approach. The definition of security policies for the organization is, the respons-
ibility of the upper management, usually based on the concepts described in Section 2.1.
These security policies provide direction to the lower levels of the organization’s hierarchy.
The responsibility of middle management is to, starting from the security policy, adopt and
develop standards, baselines, guidelines, and procedures. The operational managers must
then deploy the configurations detailed by the security management documentation and
monitor the system for exceptions to the security policy.
In a broad sense a key function of most organizations is to ”maintain security”. Every
organization is interested in securing its assets, its information and its business. The process
of designing, implementing and operating IT infrastructures is complex and, therefore, risk
prone. To better manage IT infrastructure security design, implementation and operation
those processes have been, to some extent, formalized. A goal of the process formalization
is to transform the complexity of the IT security design, implementation and operations
into a manageable process which allows for accountability and verification.
The formalization of security process can be viewed as an hierarchical organization of
information and documentation. The top level of this formalization can be viewed as a
security policy, i.e., a definition of the scope of security mechanisms needed by the or-
ganization in relation to assets that need protection. The following layer can be viewed as
security standards, baselines, and guidelines which is a more detailed technical guidance
for the enforcement of the security policies. The bottom layer is comprised of security
procedures, i.e., a detailed technical description of a specific security mechanism, control,
or solution.
Most of the reasoning in this section is a direct match to corporate world current panorama,
but also a valuable starting point when addressing Critical Utility IT Infrastructures.
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2.3 IT Infrastructures Security Management Concepts
Security management concepts and principles are fundamental elements of a security policy.
They define the parameters needed for a secure environment. They also serve as goals and
objectives that both policy creators and implementers must achieve in order to create a
secure environment.
The primary goals and objectives of security are as follows:
• Confidentiality
• Integrity
• Availability
We shall not go into extensive description given that these security principles have been
subject to much discussion and tend to be common sense for the security field practitioners.
Security controls are usually evaluated on whether they address these core information
security principles. Vulnerabilities and risks are also evaluated based on the threat they
pose against one or more of the goals and objectives stated above.
In corporate environment each of the principles tends to have the same relative weight in
relation to the other two in every stage of the security management planning process. This
research project will focus on the operational aspects of Critical Utility IT infrastructures in
regards to achieving, what are understood as the primary goals and objectives of security.
Also, when designing a security policy and deploying a security solution there are also
other security principles that need to be addressed, namely: privacy, identification, authen-
tication, authorization, accountability, non-repudiation and auditing.
Along with the security concepts, this research project also considers protection mechan-
isms. They represent some of the characteristics of security controls, namely: layering,
abstraction, data hiding and encryption. The security controls offer their protection for
confidentiality, integrity, and availability through the use of these mechanisms.
One important aspect of security management is the management of change. Change in a
secure environment can lead to vulnerabilities. To maintain security in the face of change
requires to systematically manage change. To achieve this systematic approach requires
extensive planning, testing, logging, auditing, and monitoring of activities related to secur-
ity controls. The records of changes to an environment can be used to identify agents of
change, whether those agents are objects, subjects, programs, communication pathways, or
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even the network itself. A goal of change management is to ensure that any change does
not lead to reduced or compromised security situation.
2.4 Operational Management of Critical Utility IT Infra-
structures
Most companies are aware that day-to-day operations of their corporate IT infrastructure
can be a source of security related problems. IT best practices are usually aligned with
business requirements,i.e. IT Service Management. One of the basic goals of an IT organ-
ization is to optimize server and application availability and performance.
Continuous optimization of the Critical Utility IT Infrastructure is a fundamental role of the
Operations Management team. One significant challenge these IT teams face is achieving
the balance between efficient and cost effective management. This is due, mainly, to two
factors: the functional silos, teams specialized in a specific IT technology; and the tools
or management platforms are unique, within the functional silos, in support of operations.
Difficult cooperation between distinct functional silos, due to proprietary interfaces, has
an impact on the efficiency of the management environment. Not forgetting that new ap-
plications introduced in support of business requirements require, themselves, specialized
management and monitoring. Given the above scenario, it is clear that root cause analysis
of incidents impacting business can be an challenging task in such a scenario. We can
also state that, to some extent, the existence of independent functional silos prevents the
adoption of management processes, like the ones described in Section 2.2.
Those management process controls, described in Section 2.2, are becoming a mandated
requirement for most corporations and critical utilities companies are no exception. This
shows the inter-relations between corporate management processes and IT operations man-
agement. Additionally, all this reasoning justifies the importance of cross-functional silos
integrated management.
Chapter 3 describes into technical extent the requirements of integrated management plat-
forms.
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2.5 Defense in Depth and Information Assurance in Crit-
ical Utility IT Infrastructures
One easy parallel to trace while addressing Critical Utility IT infrastructures is that of
information in support of military operations [9]. The management of SCADA systems
requires timely and accurate information, just like military warfare operation. Defense
in Depth strategy relates to managing in an integrated manner the capabilities of teams,
operations and technology to achieve effective, multi-layer, multi-dimensional resilience
to possible attacks on the infrastructure. The goal is to delay the advance of the attacker
by maintaining multiple, layered lines of defense rather than one strong defensive line,
perimeter defense.
In terms of infrastructure security, defense in depth is a security strategy wherein defenses
are overlapped so that a breach in one layer only leads the opponent to the next layer of
defenses. Layering defenses helps to prevent direct attacks against critical systems and
data, increases the probability of the attack being detected, and provides the defender with
more time to reconfigure defenses to where they are really needed in the event of an at-
tack. In figure 2.1 we provide a vision of defense in depth with relation to a critical utility
infrastructure.
The layers of defensive positions in defense in depth can be described as follows:
• Data. An attacker’s first choice target. Databases, service information, documents
contain deep knowledge on the operational scenario and tend to be trampolines to
more broad attacks.
• Application. The software that manipulates the data that is the ultimate target of
attack.
• Host. The systems that are running business critical applications.
• Internal Network. The network infrastructure.
• Perimeter. The network that connects the IT infrastructure to other networks, such as
to external users or application support.
• Physical. The tangible aspects in computing. Computers, network devices, facilities.
• Security Management Process. The overall governing principles of the security
strategy.
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






Figure 2.1: Defense in Depth Layers
Host and Application are the main concerns of our research project. The details investigated
in this research project are strictly linked to those areas of security. This approach eases the
separation of duties and concerns among distinct functional silos of an organization, and
thus eases the roll-out of this project onto an organization adhering to this strategy.
An important principle that guides defense in depth is achieving Information Assurance.
Information Assurance is an holistic principle that relates protection coverage from attacks,
by application of security mechanisms, to assure confidentiality, availability, integrity, au-
thentication and non-repudiation. It is clear to say that achieving Information Assurance
requires an organic relationship between three key elements: people, technology and oper-
ations.
People
Senior level management commitment, based on a clear understanding of the perceived
threats, is a key point in the whole strategy of defense in depth. This must be followed with
effective policies and procedures, clear definition and assignment of roles, training of users
and system operators, and infrastructure wide personal accountability and audit-ability.
This includes the establishment of physical security and personnel security measures, the
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goal is to control and monitor access to facilities and elements of the IT infrastructure
environment.
Technology
Currently, a wide variety of technologies are available in support of Information Assur-
ance. To insure that the right technologies are procured and deployed, any organization
should establish a strict policy for technology acquisition. Where and how to deploy these
technologies should be defined along the lines of Defense in Depth strategy.
In critical utility IT infrastructures the focus should be on the following general areas:
Networks - An organization needs to deploy security mechanisms at multiple locations to
handle all classes of attacks. Adversaries can attack a target from multiple points us-
ing either insiders or outsiders. These defensive standpoints should include defend-
ing the networks and communications infrastructure. The protection mechanisms
should include providing confidentiality and integrity protection for data transmit-
ted over these networks, protection from Denial of Service attacks should also be
included in both the local and wide area communications networks.
Boundaries - Firewalls and intrusion detection systems to address active network attacks.
Defend the computing environment by providing adequate access controls on hosts
to resist insider attacks.
Layering - Even the best available products have inherent weaknesses and finding an ex-
ploitable vulnerability in a system is just a matter of time and effort. To address
this problem organizations must deploy multiple defense mechanisms between the
attacker and his target. Each of these mechanisms must present unique obstacles to
the adversary and optimally should include both protection and detection measures.
These measures help increase risk of detection for the attacker while reducing his
chances of success or making successful penetrations unaffordable.
Robustness - It is necessary to specify the security strength of protection components as a
function of the value of what’s it is protecting and the threat at the point of applica-
tion, risk management. Additionally choosing where to deploy stronger mechanisms
is also of significant importance to the overall strategy.
Detection - Mechanisms should be in place in the managed infrastructures to detect in-
trusions, analyze and correlate the results and react accordingly. The goal is to turn
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infrastructures into helpers of the Operations staff. These mechanisms should allow
Operations staff to identify if the infrastructure is being attacked, what are sources
and targets of the attack and what further measures are needed to correct the situation.
Operations
Operations focuses on all the activities required to maintain an organization’s security pos-
ture on a day to day basis. These activities include:
• Managing the security evolution of the deployed technology (e.g. installing patches,
managing access control lists) ;
• Providing secure key management services ;
• Performing system security assessments to assess the readiness status of the infra-
structure ;
• Monitoring and reacting to current threats ;
• Attack sensing, warning, and response ;
• Recovery and reconstitution ;
In Chapter 4 we further analyze technical details of defense in depth in a critical utility IT
infrastructure
2.6 CRUTIAL - CRitical UTility InfrastructurAL resili-
ence
CRUTIAL is a project of the Information Society Technologies program of the European
Commission[10]. Part of what is proposed by the authors is a blueprint for a distributed
systems architecture that serves as a reference for modern critical information infrastruc-
tures. The authors propose a set of classes of techniques and algorithms based on paradigms
providing resilience to faults and attacks in an automatic way.
CRUTIAL’s vision resides in modelling interdependent infrastructures and taking into ac-
count the multiple dimensions of inter-dependencies. Additionally providing new architec-
tural patterns, resilient to both accidental failures and malicious attacks. There are several
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goals of interest, in the scope of this research project, namely: investigation of models and
architectures that address scenarios of openness, heterogeneity and evolution that electrical
utilities infrastructures are being subject to; analysis of faults in the information infra-
structure that can cause significant impacts on the controlled electric power infrastructure;
investigation of distributed architectures enabling dependable control and management of
the critical utility IT infrastructures.
As part of the the project, Verissimo, P. and Ferreira Neves, N. and Correia, M. propose a
blueprint for a reference critical information infrastructure architecture[11].
The proposed solution encompasses a range of mechanisms of incremental effectiveness,
to address from the lowest to the highest importance operations in a critical utility IT infra-
structure. They propose architectural configurations with trusted components in key places
to induce prevention of some classes of attacks. Together with middleware based automatic
tolerance of the remaining faults and intrusions.
This is a comprehensive and extensive project that introduces several new paradigms to the
management of critical utilities infrastructures and will certainly change the way critical
utility IT infrastructures are designed and planned in the foreseeable future.
2.7 Management Standards & Critical Utility IT infra-
structures
SNMP was proposed for the unification of the management information and of the admin-
istration protocols, over IP based networks [12]. SNMP is an application-layer protocol
which can serve as a platform for the monitoring and management of network attached
devices. It is commonly used in the corporate world as a unified mechanism to monitor the
status and operation of a diverse range of equipment.
The architectural model of SNMP, master-slave, permits the management and monitoring
of network attached devices by the direct polling and query of an SNMP agent by a master,
or the receipt of monitoring notification, a SNMP trap, by a master from a slave. The
operational elements that are exposed to monitoring or management through the SNMP
protocol are typically referred to as objects. A list of these objects is referred to as a
management information base (MIB). These MIBs are highly variable and while there are
some recommendations there is no fixed set of mandatory rules. At a conceptual level
the structure of the SNMP protocol makes it adequate for monitoring critical utility IT
infrastructures.
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WS-Management [13] is another standard that addresses IT management by providing a
common platform for systems to exchange management information across the IT infra-
structure. In its core are Web Services and XML flexibility tied together to manage IT
infrastructures. While it enables more management capabilities than SNMP, its overhead
may compromise attempts to use it in a critical utility IT infrastructure scenario.
2.8 Security Challenges in Critical Utility IT infrastruc-
tures
Modern critical utility IT infrastructures are commonly TCP/IP based environments, much
as the corporate infrastructure for managing the business that drives operations in a control
system, there are technology related vulnerabilities that need to be addressed. Clearly,
the main concern as control systems become part of these large architectures is providing
security procedures that cover the control system domain as well.
Network-based communications have security issues that must be addressed in the control
system domain, since vendor-specific protocols and assumed legacy system security is not
always adequate to protect these critical utility IT infrastructures. Examples of threats in
open systems architectures that can migrate to control system domains include: hostile
code, escalations of privileges, network reconnaissance and data gathering, covert traffic
analysis. With successful intrusion into control systems networks come new issues like:
attacks on operator consoles, unauthorized access into high security critical networks and
remote facilities.
There are key differences between traditional IT architectures and critical utility IT infra-
structures systems technology that impact the way to address security problems. From
a mitigation viewpoint, deploying IT security technologies into a critical utility IT infra-
structure may not be a viable solution. Even if critical utility IT infrastructure use the same
protocols that are used in corporate networks, the very nature of control system functional-
ity may turn otherwise appropriate security technologies inappropriate. These systems have
usually high time sensitive requirements, so latency and throughput associated with secur-
ity mechanisms may introduce unmanageable delays and produce high impact on overall
system performance. Table 2.1 highlights common security elements present in a corporate
infrastructure opposed to critical utility IT infrastructure.
One way to address these differences and their impact is to move into a defense in depth
strategy, as described in Section 2.5. Additionally, the importance of an integrated manage-
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Security Topic Corporate IT Critical Utility IT
Infrastructure
Anti-Virus Common Uncommon
Technology Lifetime 3-5 years Around 20 years
Patch Management Usual Rare
Change Management Easy to maintain Highly complex
Timeliness Constraints Unspecified delays are
accepted
Delays are unacceptable
Availability Service interruption subject
to SLA
Continuous
Facilities Concentrated in few locations
(mostly)
Geographically disperse
Table 2.1: Corporate VS Control Systems
ment systems and platforms has been subject to much discussion in the field of distributes
systems, Veríssimo P. et al. [14]. These platforms concentrate several functions that are nor-
mally performed by isolated tools and allow infrastructure wide management. Naturally,
some of the differences of the two worlds, corporate versus critical utility IT infrastructure,
cause impairments that prevent adoption of a more dynamic management approach. The
adoption of infrastructure wide platforms is a complicated subject to address and efficiently
study outside real testbed scenarios.
In Chapter 3 we investigate the coverage and depth of some of these system management
platforms and validate if they are adequate to produce a positive impact in regards to overall
security of a critical utility IT infrastructure and its control systems.
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Chapter 3
Survey of IT Systems Management
Software
IT systems management is a broad area which includes many related products and plat-
forms. There is a multitude of vendors that provide the widest technological coverage.
The importance of IT systems management is increasing, as enterprises mature in terms
of their attitudes to IT infrastructures and demand greater visibility into IT operations. IT
systems management solutions also have an important role in measuring the return on IT
investments. The automation of IT is another emerging function of IT systems management
that has become an important priority for enterprises seeking to improve their efficiency,
and enhance the alignment between their IT priorities and their business priorities. IT
systems management allows enterprises to rationalize their IT spend, while simultaneously
improving the efficiency of business operations and enabling self-maintaining and self-
managing IT systems. Critical utility IT infrastructures are part of this evolution.
3.1 Trends and Evolution
IT systems management solutions are evolving rapidly due to their broad scope and the fact
that they are embedded in many business and technology processes within the enterprise.
This section discusses important trends affecting the IT systems management platforms.
Rising energy prices and an increased awareness of climate change have resulted in a much
greater focus on reducing energy consumption in the enterprise with a focus on data cen-
ters and IT asset management. IT systems management solutions are key components in
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implementing power saving strategies and is expected that IT systems management offer-
ings will bring together IT and facilities management under one view. This trend will also
lead to greater integration between IT management and facilities management, since power
management requirements span both functional areas.
Enterprises are facing challenges in grasping the full benefits of their virtualization deploy-
ments. This is due to the difficulty in managing numerous virtualized servers, adequately
defining granular roles for servers, availability and performance. IT service management
platforms are expected to provide the appropriate technologies to address this challenge
and enable virtualization benefits. Virtualization management is also an crucial element
of green IT since it allows more efficient utilization of server hardware, along with an
expected reduction in the number of physical servers.
The rapid adoption of new communication technologies such as next generation networks
and enterprise voice-over-Internet protocol - VoIP - is changing telecommunication net-
works and enterprise networks. IT applications and standard IP technologies have now
replaced proprietary network applications and this fact is removing the distinction between
telecommunications networks and IT networks. The cost savings relating to a single net-
work are linked with additional risk and complexity, since that all communications will take
place in this new paradigm. With all application data, user data, voice all routed through
one network, it is of critical importance that this network is managed in a reliable and
effective manner.
Application management in IT systems management platforms has been focused on ap-
plication availability and reliability. Naturally as the importance of applications, in an
enterprise, increases so does the role of application performance management. The need
for measuring the quality and performance of application services is driven by the move
towards service oriented architecture - SOA - and the increasing prevalence of software-
as-a-service - SaaS - business models. Measuring an application’s availability along with
its performance and speed will support important metrics on the IT infrastructure. This is
specially important for managing time-sensitive applications in a critical utility IT infra-
structure.
The importance of information and the risk associated with managing it are gaining vis-
ibility from the enterprise community. Enterprises need to be aware of their IT assets,
specially sensitive information, the increasing regulatory pressure from authorities requires
enterprises to monitor access to their data and systems activity, and audit it. This need
forces IT systems management platforms to increase its level of integration with secur-
ity information. Along with delivering reliable tools to monitor IT systems for auditing,
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IT governance, and security purposes, IT systems management platforms should handle
any issues that affect global system stability. Auditing and monitoring are also extremely
important in managing, streamlining system change and configuration.
Service management, which is an integral part of an effective IT systems management
strategy, is a key component of IT and business alignment because it provides the ability to
measure the value of IT systems to the business.
3.2 IT Systems Management Platforms
In the course of the research project we evaluated several IT systems management platforms
in order to provide a central point of IT operations information and also a platform to deliver
and aggregate security related information.
Our focus was evaluating the capability to extract system and application information, and
thus enable proactive prevent reliability and availability issues. The targeted systems are
all Windows OS hosts, with few exceptions, so we considered the specific details of a Win-
dows system in the survey process. Although the reach of these management platforms can
be superimposed, by network monitoring solutions and configuration management solu-
tions, the infrastructure environment remains quite static and currently lacks broad and
deep operational insight.
Before we continue let us make a brief note on how the operations management software
performs its job and the impact it can possibly have on a critical utility IT infrastructure.
These platforms manage systems that can be agent-managed computers or agent-less man-
aged computers. A critical utility IT infrastructure has two major distinct scenarios of
operation for COTS software namely, central servers and control systems hosts. So to
some extent the problem of managing a critical utility IT infrastructure is similar to that of
desktop and server management of the corporate IT world.
3.3 Survey of Vendors and Platforms
This information was surveyed from May to November 2009.
Throughout the years HP and IBM have been very innovative in terms of technology and
have coupled their technology know-how with planned evolution and customer focus. They
both, IBM and HP, have very advanced technical features, IT concepts and significant mar-
ket experience.
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CA has invested in technology and has differentiating capabilities of IT and data center
automation, and this is a key point in the IT systems management market.
Microsoft has made significant advances in its IT systems management technology. With
the release of its System Center 2007 solution, Microsoft has broadened and improved its
IT systems management offering in terms of quality and coverage. It has also enhanced its
support for other platforms, thereby removing a key barrier against the adoption of its IT
systems management product offering. Microsoft’s technology still lacks the maturity and
breadth of more established products.
BMC’s has a broad portfolio and very strong support for Business Service Management
and mainframe management.
While the open source community creates and maintains several alternatives to the commer-
cial systems they are simply monitoring solutions that store collected events by the agents.
Of the surveyed solutions only the commercial products performed root cause analysis and
service dependency hierarchy mapping.
3.3.1 BMC
BMC offers a portfolio of Business Service Management (BSM) solutions that aim at
providing a unified platform for managing IT infrastructures[15]. BMC offers solutions
across an entire IT organization but its main focus is consulting services. Next, follows a
description of the management platforms and tools, per functional area, offered by BMC
that are designed to addresses the problems of managing a critical utility IT infrastructure.
BMC Atrium CMDB & BMC Atrium CMDB Enterprise Manager is comprised of a
data repository and a management tool that aim at ensuring a consistent view over the IT
infrastructure [16],[17]. These tool were designed to help maintain business-aware relation
between business processes, users, and IT infrastructure reflecting configuration changes
and their impact in business service.
BMC Atrium Orchestrator is comprised of specific tools that follow ITIL processes for
ServiceManagement, ProblemManagement and Service Automation, the goal is to provide
an integrated Business Service Management environment to an organization[18]. This tool
preforms like a workflow manager as it that allows the automation of routine operational
procedures across an IT infrastructure.
BMC Dashboards for BSM & BMC Analytics for BSM are two platforms that help in
providing a unified view over the an infrastructure key IT performance indicators [19],[20].
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Those indicators are fundamental in the operation and maintenance of an IT organization.
Commonly, these indicators are scattered across several IT management tools and applica-
tions, making the task of delivering an overall view of performance and availability within
an IT infrastructure a significant challenge.
3.3.2 CA
CA offers a portfolio of Enterprise IT Management solutions that aim at providing a plat-
forms for managing IT infrastructures [21]. CA is currently owner of Spectrum, which
was originally developed by Cabletron Systems, and was one of the first network manage-
ment platforms commercially available. Next, follows a description of the management
platforms and tools, per functional area, offered by CA that are designed to addresses the
problems of managing a critical utility IT infrastructure.
CA NSM is a systems management platform designed to provide integration with other
CA enterprise IT management platforms[22]. This platform provides in-depth event man-
agement along with performance reporting capabilities. Additionally it allows the creation
of a service availability view that builds on correlating events together with the control and
management systems and services.
CA Spectrum Automation Manager is a policy driven server management and automa-
tion platform[23]. This platform also provides configuration and change management. The
automation features are designed to reduce costs and increase efficiency when managing
critical operational environments.
3.3.3 EMC
EMC offers a portfolio of IT Management solutions that aim at providing a platforms for
managing IT infrastructures [24]. Next, follows a description of the management platforms
and tools, per functional area, offered by EMC that are designed to addresses the problems
of managing a critical utility IT infrastructure.
IT Operations Intelligence is a platform that was designed to gather data from events,
topology, and inventory across an IT infrastructure[25]. Using the information gathered to
deliver centralized visibility into the entire IT infrastructure. It is comprised of several tools
that provide automated, root-cause and impact analysis of networks, systems, and services.
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3.3.4 HP
HP Business Technology Optimization [26], is an initiative from HP to address IT man-
agement necessities. The which they identified primarily as: Optimize allocation of IT
resources based on business priorities, Automation of key processes across IT infrastruc-
ture, Measure IT effectiveness and efficiency.
Next, follows a description of the management platforms and tools offered by HP that are
designed to addresses the problems of managing a critical utility IT infrastructure.
HP Operations Manager i 8.10 is a platform the helps the consolidation of IT infrastruc-
ture management operations [27]. In addition to systems and network consolidation it helps
to consolidate operational processes to achieve better alignment with the business needs.
This platform comprises a suite of products that address the challenges of managing IT
operations.
HP Operations Smart Plug-ins (SPIs) are specific system plug-ins that provide intelli-
gence and operational know-how to the management platforms[28].
HP Performance Manager is an analysis and visualization performance tool that provides
operational insight on systems usage [29]. It performs system performance and bottleneck
analysis, and allows baseline, forecast, and trend systems capacity.
HP Reporter is a management reporting solution that aggregates data collected by in-
dividual HP Operations Center software tools and platforms[30]. This software delivers
historical reports and rich performance and availability data. That processed data is valu-
able management information that IT organizations can use for service level reporting and
planning.
HP SiteScope provides availability and performance metrics over a distributed IT infra-
structures [31]. The main distinctive features is that this is a agent-less monitoring plat-
form. It was designed to provide a centralized view of an entire infrastructure without
installing agents or software on production systems.
HP Universal Configuration Management Database (CMDB) platform by HP provides
operators with a single view of the truth about the relations between infrastructure, applic-
ations and business services[32]. Like other platforms this software integrates with other
HP IT management software platforms. This configuration management database supports
business service management and ITIL-based initiatives.
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3.3.5 IBM
IBM acquired a systems management company, Tivoli Systems, in 1996. The purchased
Tivoli architecture was designed to allow the management of numerous remote locations
and devices. Currently, Tivoli is part of IBM’s Integrated Service Management business
area. Next, follows a description of the platforms and tools under the Systems and Asset
Management area that are designed to addresses the problems of monitors, controlling and
optimizing the management of a critical utility IT infrastructure.
Tivoli Availability Process Manager provides coverage over IT components, applications
with relation to their business impact[33]. Its focus is on providing the necessary tools to
effectively diagnose and prioritize incidents. Gives IT operations mechanisms to determine
and prioritize impact efficiently. Allows the creation of streamlined processes for IT oper-
ations staff. Relates existing SLAs and Operating Level Agreements, enabling a focused
intervention by IT operations staff.
Tivoli Monitoring its the main monitoring platform from IBM it as a wide operating sys-
tems coverage, namely: AIX, HP Unix, IBM i family, Sun Solaris, Windows[34]. Its was
designed to provide flexible workspace to enable system monitoring. It is aimed at detec-
tion and recovery from problems, in critical system resources, in an automated manner. It
is designed to integrate with other composite application, event, network and service-level
management solutions from IBM Tivoli.
Tivoli Performance Analyzer builds on Tivoli Monitoring to provide forecasting on re-
source utilization trends, enabling to change focus on monitoring of emerging problems[35].
Enables predictive trend analysis based on key operational metrics providing a view over
system performance and capacity evolution over time. It as built-in metrics of specific dis-
tributed systems, including key performance indicators(KPIs) and thresholds that help IT
operations staff managing the infrastructure.
Tivoli Configuration Manager is the configuration management platform from IBM[36].
It provides software distribution capability that enables efficient deployment of mission-
critical applications to multiple locations from a central point. Includes an inventory mod-
ule that enables automatic discovery of hardware and software configuration information.
Additionally it can enforce adherence to your organization’s policies by changing system
configurations.
Tivoli Data Warehouse provides the repository for all systems management data and the
starting point for all Tivoli reporting solutions[37].
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3.3.6 Microsoft
Microsoft vision for IT management is the Systems Center initiative[38]. Next, follows a
description of the platforms proposed by Microsoft that can address the problem of man-
aging a critical utility IT infrastructure.
System Center Configuration Manager R2 platform provides a comprehensive solution
for change and configuration management[39]. It collects hardware and software inventory,
distributes and installs updates to software. Allow for monitoring compliance to a given
configuration.
System Center Operations Manager 2007 R2 provides an end-to-end management cap-
ability over the IT environment as it delivers a comprehensive view of the health of an
organization’s IT environment[40]. This platform enables response to events via the de-
tailed troubleshooting and best practices knowledge, included in the software package.
It is designed to use application and operating system knowledge to identify operational
problems. It provides a centralized management solution to monitor both Microsoft and
non-Microsoft platforms and unified monitoring under a single tool.
3.3.7 IT Systems Management Platform Analysis
To create a basis for comparison and analysis we must first describe the features and prop-
erties that can serve to identify the strengths and weaknesses of these IT systems manage-
ment platforms. Evaluation of these platforms is a subjective matter and naturally analysts
are subject to a lot of marketing and business pressure. In this research we try to provide
some insight on the characteristics that would enable the adoption of these platforms into a
critical utility IT infrastructure.
On the technical side these platforms can be evaluated by large sets of parameters, which
we arrange in sets to better summarize their coverage:
• A - Standards compliance and Interoperability. Grades the platform ability to adhere
to standards, preventing vendor lock-in. Additionally, interoperability relates to the
capability to operate in conjunction with legacy systems;
• B - Scalability. Relates to the degree to which the platforms can handle increasing
number of managed hosts;
• C - Integration and Development capabilities. Relates to the openness of the platform
to developer extensions;
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• D - Monitoring independence. Relates to the system dependencies that are needed to
deploy the management platform;
• E - Operational management of hosts. Relates to the capability the management
platform has to effectively manage a given type of hosts, namely Windows OS hosts;
Apart from the technology features there are some other features that need to be taken into
account when surveying these platforms. User sentiment and market impact are also valued
when evaluating these platforms. Although not directly related to technology features of
the product these metrics allow to establish comparisons related to the capacity and quality
of the software producers. User sentiment usually is gathered via interviews with current
users of the platforms and relates to factors like customer support, client engagement and
vendor service capabilities. Market impact is more directed at analyzing vendor revenues,
installed base, and geographic presence.
Table 3.1 sums up our qualitative evaluation of these platforms according to the proposed
evaluation criteria. This evaluation was biased by the restricted operational scenario of the
targeted critical utility IT infrastructure, based on the information provided by the vendors
and included all the platforms from the vendors. The grade scale from 1 to 3 indicates
limited - 1, regular - 2 and substantial - 3 technical capabilities.
Vendor A B C D E Total
BMC 2 3 1 1 1 8
CA 2 3 2 2 2 11
EMC 2 3 1 2 1 9
HP 3 3 3 2 2 13
IBM 3 3 2 2 2 12
Microsoft 3 3 3 3 3 15
Table 3.1: Comparative Table of the IT Management Platforms
3.4 Evaluation of Selected Platforms
We selected the two highest scoring vendors and chose two platforms, HP Operations Man-
ager 8.10i and , to further analyze. For this analysis we studied the documentation and
created an evaluation scenario which yields empirical insight to our evaluations.
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3.4.1 HP Operations Manager 8.10i
HP Operations Manager for Windows (HPOM) is a distributed, client-server software solu-
tion designed to provide service-driven event and performance management of enterprise
systems, applications, and services. HPOM enables management of distributed, hetero-
geneous, IT infrastructures and includes support for a broad range of Windows and UNIX
systems and applications. HPOM monitors thousands of events occurring on all managed
nodes and presents just the relevant information for a organization’s needs.
3.4.1.1 Overview
HP Operations Manager software HP Operations Manager provides comprehensive event
management, proactive performance monitoring, automated alerting, reporting and graph-
ing for operating systems, middleware and applications. HP Operations Manager software
consolidates an enterprise operations console for an entire IT infrastructure. Integration of
events from the network monitoring solution and end-user experience monitoring provides
IT operations team a comprehensive view of the managed environment.
HP Operations Manager for Windows software comprises three main components in a dis-
tributed architecture.
3.4.1.2 Operations Manager Console
The first component, the Operations Manager Console, provides the user interface for op-
erations and administration. It is available as an Microsoft Management Console client or
as a web browser interface.
To make use of the console each operator is provided with a specific user role based view,
restricting what they see and what they can do within the managed environment. User roles
include operational service views enabling operators to determine impact and root cause
analysis associated with events.
Other operational functions are enabled by built-in tools, allocated by user role, that allow
operators to run actions on managed systems, streamlining operational processes and op-
timizing operational efficiency. Additionally,a feature enables Operations Manager server
to perform auditing and logging of operator activities.
Finally, built-in performance and reporting tools support monitoring and performance ana-
lysis of the managed environment.
26
3.4.1.3 Operations Manager Server
The Operations Manager server provides the business logic and manages a database which
is used to maintain configuration information for the managed environment and the gener-
ated alerts and collected performance information.
The Operations Manager servers provide numerous functions, among them :
• Automated discovery of servers and applications infrastructure;
• Automated deployment of monitoring rules to managed nodes based on their applic-
ation role;
• Receipt of events from the agents on the managed nodes, including event correlation,
suppression and escalation;
• Consolidation of events from other tools, such as network monitors. Integration of
events from systems monitored by third-party agents or agent-less technologies. This
functionality provides a single normalized view of the managed environment;
• Forwarding of events to external notification systems and the ability to create, and
synchronize, incident tickets in help desk management systems;
• Addition of resolution guidance information into events and the provision of operator-
guided actions for issue resolution;
• Integrated scheduled and operational maintenance modes for managed systems to
prevent operations staff from seeing false alarms during authorized interventions;
• Scalable, and flexible deployment architectures including support for high-availability
cluster architectures and disaster tolerant distributed architectures with multiple Op-
erations Manager servers.
3.4.1.4 Operations Manager Agents
HP Operations Manager agents are installed on managed hosts collecting, aggregating, and
correlating monitoring information from a variety of information sources. These agents
are extensible and customizable allowing incorporation of any monitoring source not in-
cluded in the out-of-the-box monitoring policies. Additionally, agents collect and analyze
performance data and can use historical patterns to establish performance baselines.
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Note that HPOM agents are autonomous and can undertake automated corrective actions
without indication from the Operations Manager server. By using filtering, duplicate sup-
pression and correlation, the agents manage by exception only forwarding actionable events
to the Operations Manager server.
Finally, Smart Plug-Ins (SPIs) provide packaged application management for Operations
Manager. SPIs include application-specific auto-discovery, pre-defined monitoring policies,
actions, tools and detailed performance data collection. Core Smart PlugIns are included
with HP Operations Manager for Windows and provide coverage for systems and applica-
tions. Each Operations Manager Agent includes an Operating System SPI for the relevant
OS (Windows, Linux, UNIX).
3.4.2 Microsoft System Center Operations Manager 2007 R2
Microsoft System Center Operations Manager 2007 R2 (SCOM) provides the end-to-end
management capability over the IT environment. SCOM provides a comprehensive view of
the health of an organization’s IT environment. SCOM enables response to events via the
detailed troubleshooting and best practices knowledge included in the software package,
especially in Windows environments. SCOM can use application and operating system
knowledge to identify operational problems.
This platform provides a centralized management solution to monitor both Microsoft and
non-Microsoft platforms. It provides unified monitoring under a single tool as data is ag-
gregated across environments to present one picture of performance and availability.
3.4.2.1 Overview
An Operations Manager 2007 infrastructure is composed of core components and a set of
optional components. This section describes these components and features. Figure3.1
gives a high level description of key SCOM components.
3.4.2.2 Required Server Roles and Components
The basic unit of functionality of all Operations Manager 2007 implementations is the
management group. It consists of the Operations Manager database, the root management
server, the Operations console, and one or more agents that are deployed to monitored
computers or devices are the base components of a management group.
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

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  


Figure 3.1: Systems Center Operations Manager 2007 R2 Architecture
Operations Manager Database
The Operations Manager database is the first component to be installed in all management
groups. This database holds all the configuration data for the management group and stores
all the monitoring data that has been collected and processed by the agents.
Because only one Operations Manager database can be in a management group, it must be
functional for the management group to function. To mitigate the single instance of the
Operations Manager database from being a single point of failure, the Operations Manager
database can be placed in a Cluster service fail-over cluster. In addition, log shipping can
be configured so that current operations data and configuration information can be sent to
another server that is hosting a duplicate copy of the primary Operations Manager database.
Should there be a failure in the primary database, the duplicate can be updated and switched
to.
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Root Management Server
The root management server (RMS) is a special type of management server in a manage-
ment group. Only one RMS can be active per management group at a time. In brief, the
RMS is the primary point for administering the management group configuration, admin-
istering and communicating with agents, and communicating with the Operations Manager
database and other databases in the management group.
The RMS hosts the System Center Data Access service and the System Center Manage-
ment Configuration service. These services run only on the RMS. The System Center Data
Access service provides secure access to the Operations Manager database for all clients,
including the Operations console, Operations shell, and Web console. The System Cen-
ter Management Configuration service is responsible for calculating and distributing the
configuration of all management servers, agents, and management packs.
Like the Operations Manager database, the RMS role can be installed into an fail-over
cluster to make it highly resilient to primary server outages. In addition, other management
servers in the management group can be promoted to the role of RMS.
Agent
An Operations Manager 2007 agent is a service that is deployed to a computer to be mon-
itored. On the monitored device, an agent is listed as the System Center Management
service. Every agent reports to a management server in the management group. This man-
agement server is referred to as the agent’s primary management server. Agents watch
instrumentation data sources on the monitored device and collect information according to
the configuration. When the state of a monitored object changes or other criteria are met,
an alert can be generated from the agent. The agent is also able to calculate the health state
of the monitored object and report back to the management server.
Agents also have the ability to take many different types of action to help diagnose issues or
correct them. By feeding health data to the management server about the monitored device,
the agent provides an up-to-date picture of the health of the device and all the applications
that it hosts.
It is possible to monitor devices in an agent-less fashion. In this case, a management server
pools the monitored device for information.
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Operations Console
The Operations console provides a unified user interface for interacting with Operations
Manager 2007. The Operations console provides access to monitoring data, basic man-
agement pack authoring tools, Operations Manager 2007 reports, all the controls and tools
necessary for administering Operations Manager 2007, and a customizable workspace.
For a user to access the Operations console, the user account must be assigned to an Op-
erations Manager 2007 user role. A user role is the combination of a scope of devices that
access is granted to and a profile that defines what the role can do within its defined scope.
Role-based security is enforced in the Operations console so that Operations Manager ad-
ministrators can define what any given user can see in the console and what actions the user
can take on those items.
Management Packs
Management packs contain an application’s health definition as defined by the application
developers. They enable the agent to monitor the health of an application, generate alerts
when something of significance goes wrong in the application, and take actions in the ap-
plication and its supporting infrastructure to further diagnose the application or restore it to
a healthy state. Without an application, operating-system, or device-specific management
pack, Operations Manager 2007 is unaware of those entities and is unable to monitor them.
3.4.2.3 Optional Server Roles and Components
These additional server roles extend the functionality of a management group.
Management Server
Amanagement server is used primarily for receiving configurations and management packs
from the RMS and distributing them to the agents that report to the management server. It
does not perform any of the special functions of the RMS, but can be promoted to the
RMS role if the primary RMS fails. Besides increasing scalability, introducing additional
management servers in a management group for fail over scenarios.
The management server can also be used for remote monitoring purposes, for example:
URL monitoring and cross-platform monitoring.
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Gateway Server
Operations Manager 2007 requires that agents and management servers authenticate each
other and establish an encrypted communication channel before they exchange information.
Kerberos is the default authentication protocol. Since our scenario is implemented on top
of a logical Windows domain using the default authentication protocol, Kerberos, mutual
authentication is guaranteed by default for agent and management server communications.
When agents and management servers are not within the same Kerberos trust boundary,
certificate-based authentication mechanisms must be used. In this situation, a certificate
must be issued and maintained for those agents and the management servers to which they
report.
An Operations Manager 2007 gateway acts as a proxy for agent communications. The
gateway server is placed within the trust boundary of the agents (which can be a logical
domain), and all the agents communicate with it. Then the gateway server, through the
use of its computer certificate, performs mutual authentication with the management server
and forwards the agent-to-management server and management server-to-agent commu-
nications along. This then requires only one certificate for the management server and one
for the gateway.
Multiple gateway servers can be installed in a management group for the purposes of
scalability and fail-over.
Reporting Data Warehouse
The Reporting Data Warehouse stores monitoring and alerting data for historical purposes.
The management servers write their data to the Data Warehouse at the same time it is
written to the Operations Manager database, so the reports generated always contain the
most up-to-date data.
The Reporting DataWarehouse can receive data frommultiple management groups, thereby
allowing for an aggregated view of data in your reports.
Reporting Server
Operations Manager Reporting Server it is responsible for building and presenting the re-
ports from data queried from the Reporting Data Warehouse. All reports are accessed in
the Operations console, so access to reports is controlled via role-based security.
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Audit Collection Services
Audit Collection Services (ACS) collects and stores events from the Security Event Log
on monitored computers, events are stored in a separate database, the ACS database. ACS
collects all events written to the Security Event Log on computers that the ACS Forwarder
is enabled on. Events are forwarded from monitored computers to the ACS Collector,
which runs on a management server, which then processes them and writes them to the
ACS database. The events are transmitted in an encrypted, near real-time fashion from the
forwarders to the collector. A separate component, ACS Reporting, is then used to generate
reports from the stored ACS data.
A key to using ACS effectively is the development of a solid Windows Audit Group Policy
that is implemented as a domain Group Policy or a specific computer object collection (i.e.,
organizational unit) Group Policy.
ACS Forwarder
The ACS Forwarder is embedded in the Operations Manager 2007 agent, so no separate
deployment or configuration is required. The ACS Forwarder appears as the Audit For-
warder service and is disabled by default. The ACS Forwarder on an individual computer
or on groups of computers can be remotely enabled via the Operations console.
ACS Collector Server
The main purpose of the ACS Collector server is to collect, filter, and pre-process all the
Windows security log events for insertion into the database. Because the ACS collects all
security events in near real-time, vast amounts of data enters the system from the forward-
ers. The filtering mechanism at the collector allows you to specify which events you want
written to the ACS database for long-term storage.
ACS Database
After the data has been pre-processed by the ACS Collector server, it is written to its ACS
Database. Because it is a standard SQL database, it can be clustered for high-availability.
To accommodate the one-to-one relationship between collectors and databases, one can
create multiple ACS Databases on a single server.
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ACS Reporting
The ACS Reporting server as a number of pre-configured reports. But it depends on the
organization’s needs how the audit information can be used. Intrusion detection via statist-
ical anomaly behavior can be envisioned on top of the reporting services provided by ACS
Reporting.
Proxy Agent
Operations Manager 2007 has the ability to monitor network devices, computers that are
not running a Windows operating system, and computers without agents. To accomplish
monitoring of these hosts another computer that has an agent installed will perform the
monitoring remotely, a proxy agent function. The agent that is acting as a proxy for mon-
itoring other devices is a standard Operations Manager agent, but is configured differently.
Operations Manager 2007 Command Shell
The Windows PowerShell is a command-line interface for use on Windows Server 2003,
Windows Server 2008, Windows XP, and Vista operating systems. This interface was de-
veloped for use by system administrators for automating tasks.
Cross-Platform Monitoring (UNIX-based or Linux-based Computers)
Operations Manager 2007 R2 management servers and gateway servers can monitor UNIX
and Linux computers.
In cross-platform monitoring, the system center management service on the management
server or gateway server runs all the monitoring intelligence. The monitoring system cen-
ter management service communicates with the monitored computer through a WSMAN
layer[13] that is on both the management server and the computer being monitored. It is a
prerequisite that the WSMAN layer be installed on the monitored computer. SSH can be
used for installing the WSMAN layer or performing diagnostics.
3.4.2.4 Management packs
Operations Manager can work with a variety of instrumentation. It can use, namely:
Windows events, Windows performance counters, Windows Management Instrumentation
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(WMI) events, WMI performance data, Log file events, Simple Network Management Pro-
tocol (SNMP) traps. The mechanism that orchestrates how monitoring is preformed is a
Management Pack (MP). The management pack describes an application and directs Oper-
ations Manager how to monitor it. A management pack is a xml document which is divided
into several sections and must adhere to a specific schema.
3.4.3 Evaluation
We created a testbed scenario in order to evaluate these tools in a operational environment.
The scenario consisted of several hosts organized in a logical Windows Domain, we called
it SCADA.local. Table 3.2 describes function and configuration per machine.
Host OS Configuration
DC000001 Windows 2008
Server Standard
Domain controller, Network Services
SV000001 Windows 2003
Server Standard
Microsoft System Center Operations Manager 2007
R2
SV000002 Windows 2003
Server Standard
HP OpenView Operations Manager 8.10i
SV000003 Windows 2008
Server Standard
Monitoring target
DV000001 Windows 2003
Server Standard
Visual Studio 2008, MS SQL 2008
WS000001 Windows XP SP3
// Embedded
Monitoring target, Host for HP OpenView Operations
Manager 8.10i agent, Host for System Center
Operations Manager 2007 R2 agent
Table 3.2: Testbed Configuration Per Machine
Our evaluation was based on the process of configuration of the management platforms.
Depending on the platform we followed its, extensive, documentation in order to configure
some monitoring scenarios.
We also evaluated the global impact of having agents for the management platforms in-
stalled in a production system.
We came across some significant challenges when trying to relate monitoring of a critical
control system to common application monitoring. In the studied platforms agents and
monitoring ability rely on user mode performance counters, activity logs, WMI pooling or
traps and Registry events. None of the tested platforms allowed for a configurable in depth
analysis of an application’s behaviour without major drawbacks.
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On HP OpenView Operations Manager 8.10i the dependency of the whole platform on SPIs
is critical. The major difference in relation to Microsoft System Center Operations Man-
ager 2007 R2 was the nonexistence of documentation on how to develop SPIs, although it
possesses some extensive automation and integration capabilities. Additionally, this plat-
form when managing a host via an agent installs numerous extra OS components that in
turn add to the complexity of the managed host, in some control systems installing such an
agent is simply not supported.
On the other hand, Microsoft System Center Operations Manager 2007 has available an ex-
tensive documentation library, the most complete of all surveyed vendors. But the Business
Service Management capabilities of System Center 2007 make any attempt to model an ap-
plication and creating a management pack a significant challenge, specially if the modeler
is not the developer of the application.
Both vendors rely on the software application developers to create the Management Packs
and SPIs to enable integrated management capabilities. But SMNP[12] and WS-MAN[13]
support, in both platforms, adds to the monitoring capabilities via standardized methods.
In summary, both platforms have immense capabilities while addressing the monitoring
of a large-scale distributed system. However their dependence on the agents is critical.
In both platforms host agents behave like ”fat clients”, and although our claims have not
yet been tested in a real control system host we firmly believe that the overhead of such
agents operations in a real control system would turn prohibitive such a monitoring and
management scenario.
In Chapter 4 we propose to investigate the management mechanisms of the Windows OS,
the COTS operating system used in the construction of these critical utility IT Infrastruc-
tures.
In Chapter 5 we propose to investigate a lightweight monitoring solution for the Windows
OS, the COTS operating system used in the construction of these critical utility IT Infra-
structures.
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Chapter 4
Windows Management Architecture
In this chapter we will describe the process of managing Microsoft Windows operating
systems. We start by looking at the management mechanisms present in the OS in order
to better understand how to integrate this features in a IT systems management platform.
Keeping in mind that a critical utility IT infrastructure has to support control systems with
stringent operational requirements.
There are several management and configuration mechanisms for a Windows operating
system. The essential parts of any windows system are the Registry and Windows Manage-
ment Instrumentation, they play a key role in management, configuration and control of a
Windows operating system.
These mechanisms are important because IT management platform agents use them to
monitor and manage systems. In summary, they represent management mechanisms avail-
able to developers, which are in turn invoked by IT platform agents to manage a designated
host.
4.1 The Registry
The registry is a hierarchical database that stores and manages data. This data is structured
in a tree format. Each node in the tree is called a key. Each key can contain sub-keys and
data entries (values).
The registry plays a central role in the configuration and control of a Windows system. Far
from simply static data stored on the hard disk the registry it is also a view into various
in-memory structures maintained by the Windows executive and kernel.
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Applications store distinct types of data in registry entries. Usually, programs use Win32
APIs to read data from the registry. The developer specifies a registry location entry and
the API returns the value of the entry. Programs can also use the standard APIs to add and
delete registry content, and to change the values of registry entries. After it retrieves and
reads the data in the value of an entry, each program interprets the data and implements its
result independently, depending on how the program is written. A file location stored in a
registry entry might tell a program where to find a given file.
Windows operating system components use the registry in the following ways:
Setup Windows setup program and other setup programs add configuration data to the
registry. For example, new information is added when you install a new SCSI adapter
or a specific controller.
Recognizer Upon system start the hardware recognizer places hardware configuration data
in the registry. This data includes a list of hardware detected in your system. Hard-
ware detection is done by the hardware recognizer, Ntdetect.com, and the Windows
kernel, Ntoskrnl.exe, programs.
Kernel During system starts, the kernel extracts information from the registry, such as
which device drivers to load and their load order. The kernel also stores information
in registry.
Drivers Device drivers send and receive configuration data from the registry. A device
driver must report the system resources that it uses, such as hardware interrupts and
DMA channels, this information is then added to the registry. Given that programs
are so variable, it is very difficult to predict how a specific program will interpret the
registry data.
4.2 Windows Management Instrumentation
Windows Management Instrumentation (WMI) is the Microsoft implementation of Web-
based Enterprise Management (WBEM), which is an industry initiative to develop a stand-
ard interface for accessing management information in an enterprise environment. WMI
uses the Common Information Model (CIM), one industry standard, to represent systems,
applications, networks, devices, and other managed components[41]. CIM is developed
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and maintained by the Distributed Management Task Force (DMTF)[42]. WMI is the in-
strumentation mechanism through which nearly all Windows resources can be accessed,
configured, managed, and monitored. Figure4.1shows in high level architecture of WMI.
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Figure 4.1: WMI Architecture
To grasp the power and breadth of WMI, consider managing and monitoring several Win-
dows workstations and servers. To effectively manage the set of machines an operator
would have to have probably used numerous graphical administrative tools to manage re-
sources, such as disks, event logs, files, folders, file systems, networking components,
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operating system settings, performance data, processes, registry settings, security, services,
users, groups, among other details.
Graphical tools provide a functional management solution, but prior to WMI, all Windows
graphical administrative tools relied on Win32 APIs to access and manage Windows re-
sources. This was the only way to programmatically access Windows resources before
WMI. This unwanted feature left Windows operator without an effective way to automate
and audit system administrative tasks using popular scripting languages, like common ad-
ministration paradigms of Unix or Linux platforms. WMI provides a consistent model and
framework through which Windows resources are described and exposed.
Using scripting environments operators can write scripts to automate the several aspects of
enterprise systems, applications, and networks management, namely:
• Server managers can deploy scripts to retrieve performance data, manage event logs,
file systems, printers, processes, registry settings, scheduler activity, services, shares,
and numerous other operating system components and configuration settings.
• Network managers can deploy scripts to manage network services such as DNS,
DHCP, and SNMP-enabled devices.
• Security managers can perform health monitoring. Using WMI event subscriptions
to monitor and respond to event log entries as they occur, file system and registry
modifications, and other real-time operating system changes.
• Application managers can manage WMI enabled applications.
4.3 Windows Securable Objects
The basic unit of security management in Windows is a securable object. Simply put, a
securable object is an object that can have permissions applied to it. The different types of
securable objects in a Microsoft Windows include:
• Files
• Directories
• Registry keys
• Kernel objects (events, semaphores, mutexes)
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• Services
• Threads
• Processes
• Firewall Ports
• Window stations and desktops
• Active Directory objects
These objects are subject to modification by the normal operation of the Operating System
and its applications. These are points of observation to the behavior of the whole Operating
System, can be related to functional patterns, and can used to describe faults, errors and
failures of the OS and its applications.
41
42
Chapter 5
Monitoring COTS Control Systems
To be able to describe the system behavior on meaningful operating scenarios we need to
monitor a given system under operational stress. One mechanism provided by Windows
Operating Systems is called Event Tracing for Windows (ETW) and we can build on that
mechanism to preform detailed analysis on the operating system behavior.
5.1 Event Tracing
Event tracing signifies collecting meaningful events from parts of the operating system of
interest to our research. The ETW architecture allows for dynamic and efficient trace and
event management.
Event tracing for Windows (ETW) is a tracing mechanism provided by the Windows Op-
erating System. ETW supports user-mode programs and kernel-mode device drivers. The
logging mechanism uses per-processor buffers that are written to disk by a separate writer
thread. ETW events include metadata, message strings, and structured data payloads for
processing of event data.
Additionally, ETW can enable or disable tracing features dynamically, which makes it
possible to perform detailed tracing in production environments without requiring system
reboots. This is of great value to us since one of our future goals is to preform detailed
analysis of the Windows OS in a real environment with critical control systems.
ETW is one of the key instrumentation technologies on Windows platforms. Next we
present an overview of ETW architecture and usage model.
The core architecture of ETW is illustrated in Figure 5.1. As shown, there are three main
types of components in ETW: event providers, controllers and consumers. Additionally,
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Figure 5.1: ETW Architecture
event trace sessions are responsible for buffering, logging and creating a trace file. There
are several logging modes available for ETW sessions. For instance, a session can be
configured to deliver events directly to consumer applications or to overwrite a circular log
file. A separate writer thread created for each session flushes events to a file or to real-time
consumer applications. To enable higher performance per-processor buffers are used to
eliminate the need for locks while logging.
An event provider is a logical mechanism that writes events to ETW sessions. An Event
is just any activity of a given significance can be an event. As explained above an event
provider can be a user-mode application, a managed application, a driver, or other program.
There is one requirement however, the event provider must register a provider ID with ETW
through the registration API. A provider first registers with ETW and then writes events
from within the code by invoking the ETW logging API. When a provider is enabled by the
ETW controller application, calls to the logging API send events to a specific trace session
designated by the controller.
An event consists of a fixed header that includes event metadata and additional variable
user-context data. Due to the growing event instrumentation in many OS and development
components, even a common simple application will already contain several components
that are event providers. When an event is logged to a session, ETW adds a extra data
items along with the user-provided data, namely: timestamps, process ID, thread ID, pro-
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cessor number and CPU usage data of the logging thread. These items are recorded in
the ETW event header and passed on to event consumers together with the variable event
content given by the provider. These data fields can be essential to consumers to preform
appropriate analysis.
A controller manages, starts or stops, ETW sessions and can enable providers to the ses-
sions. In some debugging scenarios a controller tool is invoked, as needed, to collect in-
depth traces. In contrast, and of special importance to this research, for events such as
admin-targeted events providers are enabled automatically by the event log service when
they register. From an access control point of view a controller must have a specific ETW
permission on a Windows system to be able to control sessions.
A consumer is a program that can read log files or, more importantly for critical control
systems, listens to a session’s real time events and while processing them. Event consump-
tion is callback mechanism where a consumer registers an event callback, which the ETW
mechanism calls event by event. This enables events being delivered to the consumer in
chronological order.
The ETW architecture allows for sessions and providers to coexist in different conceptual
spaces. A controller is responsible for starting and stopping ETW sessions and enabling
providers to sessions. A controller can choose to enable a group of providers to a session,
disable some of them after a while, and enable another provider to that same session later.
Sessions operate in the kernel and are not statically linked to providers. Likewise, providers
are not aware of which sessions are logging their events.In a generic system there can
be large scale applications and services that are providers, controllers, and consumers at
the same time. This separation of providers and trace sessions makes tracing immune
to application problems such as crashes or hangs. Events can be used by developers, IT
administrators, and management tool developers for debugging, monitoring, diagnosis, and
capacity planning.
5.2 Analysis Techniques
A kernel trace can contain, and usually contains, much more information than one is inter-
ested in. We studied Windows SDK[43] and Windows Performance Analysis Tools [44] to
gain insight on the Windows architecture and on the performance impact of using ETW for
monitoring critical control systems.
One option that a researcher does have is to build its own event trace consumer and perform
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treatment of events in real-time. The overhead for that treatment depends on the number of
events consumed and the extra processing by event. In special cases, where specific applic-
ations are ETW producers, real-time monitoring can be achieved with very low overhead.
One other option in analyzing an event trace is using a trace file, (*.etl) which is just the
output buffers produced by the kernel trace session written to a file. This data is raw no pre-
processing is done on the file and no metadata is associated with it, since it comes directly
from the kernel. This feature allows for efficient event tracing but it also, to some extent,
impairs real-time system wide monitoring.
Before off-line analysis may take place we must use a merge tool, xperf [45]. Xperf will
merge metadata to the trace. This merge step must happen on the system where the trace
was taken and this process requires core trace processing components to do a lot of pro-
cessing on the raw trace data. This includes mapping process IDs (PIDs) to file and process
names, mapping addresses to file names, loading symbols for address, unifying stacks. Care
must be taken when trying to use these mechanisms on production environment systems,
specially on control systems where timeliness requirements are strict.
The usual off-line analysis methodologies based on events can be categorized into the fol-
lowing techniques:
• Scanning through the event file to find specific events or a simple pattern of known
events.
• Statistical analysis can be done by studying event distribution or simply by event
counting. Certain occurrences of events ( Page Faults, for example) provide addi-
tional insight into system behavior.
• A state machine approach can be constructed on a given set of events. Such a state
machine would prove invaluable in simulations of the control environment and in the
construction of a operational profile. This is possible since the large majority of core
OS activities are instrumented with ETW events. Specific Kernel, OS traces can be
used to build a state machine for resource tracking (i.e, keeping track of scheduler,
memory, I/O activities, TCP/IP activities).
• Distributed control systems consist of several components interconnected via net-
work. They span multiple machines, each serving a distinct role. Instrumenting
control requests at distinct systems is one approach to obtain end-to-end visibility
of related events. It is possible to instrument applications to record activities along
46
with the unique ID for a given request. Upon event processing, events that corres-
pond to the request ID can be correlated and progress can be evaluated. Following
this approach is fairly simple to isolate a group of typical requests, through a stat-
istical analysis, that serve as an application baseline. Therefore enabling end-to-end
monitoring.
5.3 Windows OS Event Providers
OS event providers are components of the OS and its applications that have been instru-
mented to generate events.
When doing performance or baseline analysis researchers have to carefully choose which
providers have the desired relevance. Such a task should have solid theoretical foundations,
but nonetheless it should result from an empirical study of the environment, systems and
applications.
To better illustrate our claims next follows a small subset of default enabled event providers:
...
Microsoft-Windows-User-PnP
Microsoft-Windows-DiskDiagnostic
Microsoft-Windows-Firewall
Microsoft-Windows-DiskDiagnosticDataCollector Ntfs
Microsoft-Windows-IPBusEnum
Microsoft-Windows-StartupRepair
Microsoft-Windows-UAC-FileVirtualization Microsoft-Windows-GroupPolicy
Microsoft-Windows-Kernel-General
Microsoft-Windows-Kernel-PnP
Microsoft-Windows-Resource-Exhaustion-Detector
Microsoft-Windows-TPM-WMI
Microsoft-Windows-HttpEvent
Microsoft-Windows-Kernel-WHEA
Microsoft-Windows-ResourcePublication
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Microsoft-Windows-MemoryDiagnostics-Schedule
...
Of particular importance to our research is the kernel instrumentation. The kernel provider
exposes large amounts of information, and the event generation can be controlled via flags
and/or groups. Kernel provider flags enable/disable the logging of a kernel event type. For
example, if PROC_THREAD is used in the definition of a session, events will be logged
for process creation or deletion. Next, in table 5.1, the default kernel flags for Windows
2008 Server.
Flag Name Function
PROC_THREAD Process and Thread create/delete
LOADER Kernel and user mode Image Load/Unload events
PROFILE CPU Sample profile
CSWITCH Context Switch
COMPACT_CSWITCH Compact Context Switch
DISPATCHER CPU Scheduler
DPC DPC Events
INTERRUPT Interrupt events
SYSCALL System calls
PRIORITY Priority change events
ALPC Advanced Local Procedure Call
PERF_COUNTER Process Perf Counters
DISK_IO Disk I/O
DISK_IO_INIT Disk I/O Initiation
FILE_IO File system operation end times and results
FILE_IO_INIT File system operation (create/open/close/read/write)
HARD_FAULTS Hard Page Faults
FILENAME FileName (e.g., FileName create/delete/rundown)
SPLIT_IO Split I/O
REGISTRY Registry tracing
DRIVERS Driver events
POWER Power management events
NETWORKTRACE Network events (e.g., tcp/udp send/receive)
VIRT_ALLOC Virtual allocation reserve and release
MEMINFO Memory List Info
ALL_FAULTS All page faults including hard, copy on write
Table 5.1: Flags Per Function
A kernel provider group is a set of flags of importance for a given component or area of
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interest. For example, the group Latency consists of the necessary flags to provide inform-
ation necessary to do latency related analysis. Multiple groups and flags can be enabled
for the same trace. Next, in table 5.2 follow the default kernel groups for a Windows 2008
Server.
Group Name Enabled Flags
Base PROC_THREAD + LOADER + DISK_IO + HARD_FAULTS +
PROFILE + MEMINFO
Diag PROC_THREAD + LOADER + DISK_IO + HARD_FAULTS +
DPC + INTERRUPT + CSWITCH + PERF_ R +
COMPACT_CSWITCH
DiagEasy PROC_THREAD + LOADER + DISK_IO + HARD_FAULTS +
DPC + INTERRUPT + CSWITCH + PERF_ R
Latency PROC_THREAD + LOADER + DISK_IO + HARD_FAULTS +
DPC + INTERRUPT + CSWITCH + PROFILE
FileIO PROC_THREAD + LOADER + DISK_IO + HARD_FAULTS +
FILE_IO + FILE_IO_INIT
IOTrace PROC_THREAD + LOADER + DISK_IO + HARD_FAULTS +
CSWITCH
ResumeTrace PROC_THREAD + LOADER + DISK_IO + HARD_FAULTS +
PROFILE + POWER
SysProf PROC_THREAD + LOADER+ PROFILE
Network PROC_THREAD + LOADER + NETWORKTRACE
Table 5.2: Flags Per Group
5.4 Kernel Trace Analysis
Windows OS features hundreds of event providers from various components and applic-
ations. From the core OS ETW events available there are several analysis techniques
that can be used to provided needed insight on a scenario with stringent timeliness re-
quirements. Individual events indicate run-time changes in the core OS, but together with
context-sensitive analysis methods, they can be used to add insight into patterns and prob-
lems in resource usage. This tracing mechanism enables, for example, the construction of
state machine baselines that can be used by monitoring functions to assert deviations from
normal behavior. Next follows the description of the information that can be extracted by
analyzing a kernel trace. Other types of information can be extracted, but we will focus on
the information that will allow us to monitor, manage and build better control systems in
critical utility IT infrastructures.
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5.4.1 Process, Thread, Modules, Process Counter Events
A thread is a basic unit of execution on the Windows OS, and a process acts as a con-
tainer for threads. Each process, and thread, is assigned an unique ID while it is running.
Processes and threads generate two types of events: Start events, generated when a pro-
cess/thread starts, and End events, when a process/thread terminates. The event payload
for process/thread has several details about the process. For reference, table 5.3 displays a
XML dump of a process end event.
<Event xmlns="http://schemas.microsoft.com/win/2004/08/events/event">
<System>
<Provider Guid="{9e814aad-3204-11d2-9a82-006008a86939}" />
<EventID>0</EventID>
<Version>1</Version>
<Level>0</Level>
<Task>0</Task>
<Opcode>1</Opcode>
<Keywords>0x0</Keywords>
<TimeCreated SystemTime="2009-10-09T12:54:25.915493800Z" />
<Correlation ActivityID="{00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000}" />
<Execution ProcessID="4" ThreadID="108" ProcessorID="0" KernelTime="195"
UserTime="0" />
<Channel />
<Computer />
</System>
<EventData>
<Data Name="ProcessId">0x4</Data>
<Data Name="TThreadId">0x86C</Data>
</EventData>
<RenderingInfo Culture="pt-PT">
<Opcode>End</Opcode>
<Provider>MSNT_SystemTrace</Provider>
<EventName xm-
lns="http://schemas.microsoft.com/win/2004/08/events/trace">Thread</EventName>
</RenderingInfo> <ExtendedTracingInfo
xmlns="http://schemas.microsoft.com/win/2004/08/events/trace">
<EventGuid>{3d6fa8d1-fe05-11d0-9dda-00c04fd7ba7c}</EventGuid>
</ExtendedTracingInfo>
</Event>
Table 5.3: XML dump of Process End Event
Without going into much detail, every process and thread that is active during event collec-
tion can be traced using process and thread events. These details on processes and threads
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are the starting point when establishing a state machine approach for a system behavior.
For example, when modeling a state machine for a given system behavior, it could be valu-
able to keep a list of active processes and threads along with a list of terminated processes
or threads.
Module, library or image events correspond to the loading, and unloading, of module files
to, and from, the process address space. These events allow for the tracking of loaded
modules, libraries and the mapping of addresses within a process. This event payload
contains details such as: module address base, size, name of the binary file. These events
are required for decoding call-stacks, again extremelly important when considering a state
machine approach for a system behavior study.
Process counter events record in its payload a details regarding the process execution stat-
istics over the lifetime of the process. These counters describe process behavior in respect
to memory utilization. Not so useful for state machine approach, but still valuable for
system wide analysis of memory usage.
5.4.2 Context Switch and Interrupt Service Routine Events
Context switch events are logged on every thread switch. This information can be used to a
time-line with relation to which threads have been running and for how long. Context switch
event details contains old and new thread IDs, old and new thread priorities, wait reason
and wait time. Many situations may lead to a context switch, namely: blocking on kernel
synchronization objects, preemption by a higher priority thread, changes in thread affinity.
Together with call-stacks mechanism, Context switch events allow in-depth analysis on
reasons that lead to threads getting preempted.
Interrupt Service Routine (ISR) events details record entry time, routine address, ISR vector
and ISR return value. Deferred procedure calls(DPCs) are kernel-mode functions executed
at elevated interrupt-level execution mode. DPCs together with ISRs are critical compon-
ents of a Windows driver. These DPC & ISR events can be used to monitor behavior of
drivers and kernel-mode components. Used together with module event details, the routine
address can be compared for determining which kernel component responsible for those
DPC and ISR events.
In a state machine approach, combining Context switch, DPC & ISR event details enables
an accurate accounting of system behavior and CPU utilization. With these mechanisms it
is possible to analyze what the CPU was doing at any given time and what piece of code it
was executing.
51
5.4.3 Memory Events
Memory events can be: Page Fault events or Hard Page Fault events. A Page Fault event
payload contains the address of the virtual memory for which a page fault has occurred and
the instruction pointer that caused it. Accordingly, a Hard Page Fault event requires disk
access to occur and typically has a considerably larger impact on performance. Hard Page
Fault event payload details consist of file key, offset and thread ID, which identifies the
thread causing the page fault. This enables the correlation of Page Fault events to threads
and processes, when considering a state machine approach.
5.4.4 Network Events
Network events can be logged when network activities occur at TCP/IP and UDP/IP layers.
TCP/IP events are logged on the following actions by the network drivers: Send, Receive,
Disconnect, Retransmit, Reconnect, Copy, and Fail. The details contain the packet size,
source and destination IP addresses, ports, the originating process id for Send type events
and the target process id for Receive type events. This means that Network events can be
related to a process, adding considerable insight to a baseline analysis or the construction
of a state machine emulator for a given system.
5.4.5 Registry Events
Registry operations are instrumented with ETW, therefore Registry events can be attributed
to processes and threads. Registry events can be extremely useful in characterizing Registry
access patterns. The Registry event payload details also the return status of registry opera-
tions, which can be used to monitor registry operation failures and effectively describe the
utilization, by any process, of the Registry.
5.4.6 Sample-Based Profile Events
Profile events allow characterizing where CPU spent its time in execution. Sample-based
profile events makes Windows kernel turn on profiling interrupts, which causes Profile
events to be logged from each processor at a fixed rate. The Profile event payload details
consists of the thread id of the thread running on a given processor and the value of the
instruction pointer register at the time of the profiling interrupt. Together with Process and
Thread events it is simple to generate a per-process CPU usage report, and using Image load
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events it is possible to trace CPU usage to a loaded module. Additionally, if binary symbols
are available and with call-stacks enabled for Profile events, it is possible to describe how
a given function in a given module is invoked.
5.4.7 System Call Events
Windows core OS system calls are the interface into the Windows kernel which, from the
developer point of view, consist of several APIs. This instrumentation serves the purpose
of monitoring system calls made by user mode applications or kernel mode components.
There are two types of System Call events: Enter and Exit. A System Call Enter event
relates to an invocation of a system call and logs the address of the called system service
routine. A System Call Exit event relates to an exit from a system call. System Call events
are useful for statistical analysis on system call activities and latencies.
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Chapter 6
IT Managment Platform Agent Profiling
6.1 Testbed
In the course of the research project we evaluated several operations management platforms
in order to provide a central point of IT operations information and also a platform to deliver
and aggregate security related information. The tested scenario builds on the scenario
presented in Subsection 3.4.3 and was used for evaluating the agents of those platforms.
The testbed scenario assumes a computer network where the machines are Windows 2008,
Windows 2003, Windows XP and Windows Embedded arranged in a logical Windows
domain.
Our focus is evaluating the impact of the platforms enforcing operational management on
the systems. Of particular interest was the system behavior of the Agent Processes and
Threads of the studied platforms.
We performed kernel trace analysis for the two platforms studied, and propose alternative
solution for monitoring and managing such scenarios. We devised simple experiments that
consist in measuring the impact of remote management and monitoring of the agents of the
platforms. We tested several operational scenarios and provide some of most significant
results next.
6.2 HP Operations Manager 8.10i Agent Scenario
The experiment started by deploying the agent on a Windows XP system and then analyz-
ing the kernel event traces during monitoring and management operations specified by the
operator.
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In Figure 6.7 we can observe, in dark yellow, the Idle process, and, in other colors, the
impact of HP Operations Manager Agent processes in the overall CPU usage of the system.
Figure 6.1: CPU Sampling of HP Agent Processes + Idle (System Overview)
In Figure 6.2 we can observe a detailed view of the impact of Agent Processes of HP
Operations Manager 8.10i.
Figure 6.2: CPU Sampling of HP Agent Processes + Idle (Detailed View)
In Figure 6.3 we can observe the 100% utilization of the CPU upon executing monitoring
and management operations, by the Agent Processes, on the HP Operations Manager 8.10i
platform.
Figure 6.3: Total CPU Utilization (Detailed View)
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These examples of the impact of Agent Processes on global system performance show that
the HP Agents can have a significant impact in a critical control system. The scenarios
consisted of simple monitoring and management operations. We could not restrict, by any
known configuration, the system impact of the Agent Processes of HP Operations Manager
8.10i.
6.3 Microsoft Systems Center Operations Manager 2007
R2 Agent Scenario
The experiment started by deploying the agent on a Windows XP system and then analyz-
ing the kernel event traces during monitoring and management operations specified by the
operator.
In Figure 6.4 we can observe, in green, the Idle process, and the impact of Systems Center
Operations Manager Agent Processes in the overall CPU usage of the system.
Figure 6.4: CPU Sampling of SCOM Agent Processes + Idle (System Overview)
In Figure 6.5 we can observe a detailed view of the impact of Agent Processes of Systems
Center Operations Manager 2007 R2.
Figure 6.5: CPU Sampling of SCOM Agent Processes + Idle (Detailed View)
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In Figure 6.6 we can observe the 100% utilization of the CPU upon executing monitoring
and management operations, by the Agent Processes, on the Systems Center Operations
Manager 2007 R2.
Figure 6.6: Total CPU Utilization (Detailed View)
These examples of the impact of Agent Processes on global system performance show that
the Microsoft Systems Center Operations Manager 2007 R2 Agents can have a significant
impact in a critical control system. The scenarios consisted of simple monitoring and
management operations. We could not restrict, by any known configuration, the system
impact of the Agent Processes Systems Center Operations Manager 2007 R2.
6.4 ETW Agent Scenario
We devised an experiment to evaluate ETW monitoring and profiling impact.
We created two Windows console applications: rt-app, a event provider which can gener-
ate on-demand ETW events; rt-sup, a event consumer which receives and handle real time
events produced by rt-app. These are both user-mode applications, but these methods can
be ported to a specific device driver. This is important since the task of monitoring control
systems most certainly requires in-depth, driver level, instrumentation.
The test consisted of two concurrent ETW sessions, a kernel real-time tracing session and
the application monitoring session, rt-app and rt-sup. The experiments took place on both
a Windows 2008 Server Standard and on a Windows XP running in a VMWare virtual
machine, so we can defend that these tests in physical machines would yield better results.
The event provider application, rt-app, was instrumented in a way to generate, on demand,
20000 consecutive events with distinct payload. The event consumer application, rt-sup,
links to the real-time session and writes the received events to a console application.
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In Figure 6.7 we can observe, in green, the Idle process and the impact of rt-sup and rt-app
in the overall CPU usage of the system.
Figure 6.7: CPU Utilization of rt-app + rt-sup + Idle Process (Overview)
In Figure 6.8 we can observe a detailed view of the impact of rt-app and rt-sup in the
overall system performance. Please note that the highest impact on the overall performance
is not directly mapped to rt-app and rt-sup, the impact is due to user-mode and kernel-
mode processes that handle IO operations of console applications.
Figure 6.8: CPU Utilization of rt-app + rt-sup + Idle Process (Detailed View)
In Figure 6.9 we can observe the utilization of the CPU, under 100%, upon executing
monitoring operations.
Figure 6.9: Total CPU Utilization (Detailed View)
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6.5 Evaluation
The experiments described above are a small subset of the whole set of experiments we per-
formed. Nevertheless, they graphically summarize our findings regarding the performance
impact of the studied agents.
HP Operations Manager 8.10i agent is more than a simple service. The default installation
of HP’s agent deploys more than 15 individual packages on Windows XP, with several
services supporting agent functionality.
Microsoft Systems Center Operations Manager 2007 R2 agent installs one service.
The management operations, that triggered agent execution, consisted in evaluating a small
subset of system information ( logged on users, running processes and few additional de-
tails). We have come to realize that the agents act has web servers parsing management
and operations requests from the IT management platforms. The parsing and execution of
commands bring higher performance overhead, that is due to the fact that these agents are
generic by design.
To address the problems, stated above, we propose using fixed behavior monitoring agents.
Fixed behavior monitoring agents require precise operational insight on the systems being
monitored. That insight can be achieved by using ETW to profile these critical control
systems in a pre-production environment and then constructing agents to supervise the
behavior of the system and the control applications.
To further investigate our claims we created an experiment to observe the performance
impact of using application event supervision, via ETW. The test application provided a
shower of events with distinct payload and we could then verify causal order on the events
received by the supervisor application. Additionally, we could attest the low performance
impact of the monitoring techniques.
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Chapter 7
Conclusion and Future Work
7.1 Conclusion
In support of Defense in Depth strategy, defended along this research project for these
critical utility IT infrastructures, we can argue that monitoring and proactively managing
these infrastructures is of critical importance. The platforms offered by several vendors
offer end-to-end monitoring and root cause analysis, but that comes with a significant cost
that is certainly unmanageable in a critical control system scenario.
We have studied, to some extent, the impact of monitoring and management agents of
these platforms. Additionally, we investigated techniques to develop low-impact monitor-
ing solutions. We have shown that applications instrumented with ETW can benefit from
precise light-weight correlation of application and OS activities. Likewise, management
tools can be developed to take advantage of the core system events and ETW analysis tech-
niques. Creating better monitoring and management agents will benefit IT operations on
such infrastructures.
The importance of the studied questions grows when we consider that in the near future the
number of critical control systems based on COTS will continue to grow.
7.2 Future Work
One interesting research followup would be investigating diversity capabilities of COTS
systems supporting critical utility IT infrastructures. Our work focused on Microsoft Win-
dows OS but the critical control systems implemented on Linux systems have the same
constraints as the Windows OSs we investigated.
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In Windows based control systems incorporating ETW monitoring into applications would
allow to achieve end-to-end monitoring. Evaluating the end-to-end impact of a monitoring
solution in critical utility IT infrastructures would yield insight into scalability and perform-
ance problems, and even global application level abnormal behavior detection. Addition-
ally, the development of a light-weight multipurpose agent bearing kernel-level application
monitoring and system-wide management capabilities. Such agent could be implemented
in order to provide SNMP functionality, given its inherent low overhead capabilities.
Studying the possibility of creating state-machine supervisors to the control systems ap-
plications became more interesting as we discovered the capabilities of ETW mechanisms.
A future direction on our research could be the feasibility of such systems.
Integrating the knowledge provided by the studied monitoring capabilities into Network
and System Intrusion Detection Systems (IDS) would extended the common capabilities of
such systems, the extent of the improvement should be subject to further study. Similarly,
together with Security Information and Event Management (SIEM) platforms the potential
to achieve global coverage on the security of critical utility IT infrastructures.
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